Theological anthropology focuses on the doctrine of humanity and explores such topics as the nature and origin of human beings and the image of God. Historically, much discussion has been dedicated to the soul, or immaterial aspect of human nature, with little or no attention given to the body, or material aspect.[1] This essay proposes that the proper state of human beings is embodiment and seeks to rectify some of the historical and (even) contemporary oversight of embodiment. It will pursue this thesis—which I will call the “embodied person” view—by some close interaction with a contemporary theologian, Joshua Farris, and his fine work An Introduction to Theological Anthropology.[2] Both of us hold that humans are composed of soul and body but we emphasize different aspects of that dualist human constitution: Farris, the immaterial; I, the material.
1. This oversight is due in large measure to the devasting impact of Gnosticism on Christian theology.
2. Joshua R. Farris, An Introduction to Theological Anthropology: Humans, Both Creaturely and Divine (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2020).
Farris’ View: The Soul Has Priority over the Body
For various reasons, Farris holds to a form of dualism that prioritizes the soul.[3] As he discusses the question “What am I?” Farris articulates a view of human nature that at its core is an immaterial substance.[4] In support, he cites Solomon’s description of death—“the dust returns to the ground it came from, and the spirit [ruah] returns to God who gave it” (Eccl. 12:7)—and notes that the description “presupposes this understanding that humans are soul body compounds.” He understands the “dust” to refer to the body, he takes the “spirit” or “breath” [ruah] to refer to “the life that is given . . . to the body to make it alive,” and he identifies the “breath” with the soul.[5]
3. For example, he appeals to the simplicity argument of Stewart Goetz, “Modal Dualism: A Critique,” in Kevin Corcoran, ed., Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 89-104. Farris buttresses his view by appealing to the “commonsense understanding of humans:” “souls (or immaterial spirits) seem to be the common belief” among all people everywhere. . . . “We are inclined to believe that we are distinct from our bodies . . . to believe in something like a soul prior to any tutoring, and this has been the case throughout most of history for most people in most parts of the world” (Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 21).
4. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 20.
5. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 20. I concur with his first two points (dust = body, spirit/breath = the enlivening principle) but disagree with his identification of breath with the soul. If all living things possess the breath of life (Gen 1:30; 7:22), then do all living things (e.g., dogs and giraffes) have souls?
Farris continues with other biblical support for the priority of the soul in his version of dualism. He appeals to biblical passages in which a soul or a spirit is said to do some action, which leads him to draw the conclusion that the soul or spirit, which is distinct in some way from the body, is the essential aspect of human existence. For example:
- Luke 1:46: Mary said, “My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God my Savior.” Farris explains that Mary “is referring “to the whole self (in the sense of a merism: by referring to the whole self through its parts), yet she seems to be referring to the subject of her own actions not reducible to the parts therein and not captured by the whole of the parts that she has. Instead, she is referring to some subject that has desires, emotions, thoughts, inclinations, volitional states, and the like. She is neither her body nor the parts of her body. She is, arguably, something other than her body, or at least something higher than the body she inhabits.”[6]
6. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 22-23.
- Psalm 42:11: Why are you cast down, O my soul, and why are you in turmoil within me? Hope in God; for I shall again praise him, my salvation and my God.” Farris comments, “The psalmist is assuming some distinction between self or soul and body. The psalmist does not reflect on or speak directly to the body or the parts of the body, as if they can respond. Rather, he communicates with his soul or self in an attempt to bring about some causal change in the emotional states he is experiencing.”[7]
7. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 23.
He adds two other biblical passages that use the word “spirit” (pneuma):
- Luke 23:46 (Jesus crying out and citing Psalm 31:5): “Father, into your hands I commit my spirit.”
- Acts 7:59 (Stephen crying out): “Lord Jesus, receive my spirit.”
Farris concludes: “Conceptually, these and other NT passages point us in the direction of personal persistence after somatic [i.e., bodily] death.”[8]
8. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 23.
Problems with Farris’ View
The passages Farris cites, however, can readily be rendered from the first-person perspective, such that these verses would not support the priority of the soul over the body. In fact, if the soul/spirit in these texts is understood as the acting subject, then these passages fit better with an embodied person view:
- Luke 1:46-47: Mary said, “I magnify the Lord and rejoice in God my Savior.” This rendition is certainly less poetic, but it is metaphysically true if Mary is the acting subject in all her offerings of praise to God (see later discussion).
- Luke 23:46 (Jesus crying out): “Father, I yield my life into your hands.” This rendition is clearly not a citation from Psalm 31:5, but it is metaphysically true if Jesus is the acting subject in all his obedient actions directed toward the Father (see later discussion).
As for Farris’ interpretation that these passages “point us in the direction of personal persistence after somatic death,” indeed they express hope in post-mortem existence.[9] But is this existence that of a soul or spirit or is it the existence of a disembodied person? I will return to this question.
9. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 23.
Specifically, if one marshals biblical passages in this fashion, making much of the word “soul” or “spirit” as that which continues after death, what should one make of the following affirmations?
- Philippians 1:21–24: “For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. If I am to live in the flesh, that means fruitful labor for me. Yet which I shall choose I cannot tell. I am hard pressed between the two. My desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better. But to remain in the flesh is more necessary on your account.” For the Christian to die and be with Christ is gain and is far better than continuing in this earthly existence, but Paul uses the first-person singular (“I”) and not the words “soul” (“to die is gain for my soul”) or “spirit” (“my desire is for my spirit to depart and be with Christ”).
- 2 Corinthians 5:6–8: “So we are always of good courage. We know that while we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith, not by sight. Yes, we are of good courage, and we would rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord.” The Christian prefers being absent from the body and being with the Lord, but Paul uses the first-person plural (“we”) and not the words “soul” or “spirit” (“our soul/spirit would rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord”).
Accordingly, Farris’ variety of dualism gives priority to the human soul as the primary constituent of human nature, but it is not an airtight position.
My View: Human Beings as “Embodied Persons”
Contrary to Farris, I propose an “embodied person” view grounded on the thesis that the proper state of human existence is embodiment. I can say that “I am my body,” because I rely on my bodily composition for my very existence between my conception and my death. I cannot say “I am only my body” or “I am identical with my body.”[10] Moreover, my “embodied person” view maintains that during this earthly existence, I have a basic and direct experience of myself as an embodied person. I believe that “I am my body” in the following way:
10. The affirmation is not “I am only my body” (I hope we all would disagree with that statement), nor is the affirmation “I am identical with my body” (which the constitutional view of human nature rightly denies). I do not affirm (reductive, or non-reductive) physicalism, nor do I affirm the identity thesis of I and my body. Both views have their problems.
- The way I feel about my embodiedness significantly conditions the way I feel about the world.[11]
- I am who I am principally in virtue of the fact that I have the body I have[12]
- If I had a different body— say, that of my spouse or that of my best friend— I would be a different person altogether.
- Without this body I do not exist, and I am myself as my body.[13]
11. James B. Nelson, Body Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992).
12. Justin E. H. Smith, “Introduction,” in Embodiment: A History, ed. Justin E. H. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2.
13. Vladimir Iljine, quoted without bibliographic detail in Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, I Am My Body: A Theology of Embodiment, trans. John Bowden (New York: Continuum, 1995), 2. For further discussion see Gregg R. Allison, Embodied: Living as Whole People in a Fractured World (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2021), ch. 1.
Furthermore, I intuit that every other person who has ever existed, exists now, and will ever exist is an embodied person, perceives him/herself as an embodied person, and can reflect on what it means to be an embodied person. Finally, and foundationally, I believe that persons, not natures, act, make decisions, believe, rebel, and more. Souls do not worship; persons do (Luke 1:46: Mary is the acting subject in all her offerings of praise to God). Spirits do not exercise a will, persons do (Luke 23:46: Jesus is the acting subject in all his obedient actions directed toward the Father). This conviction puts me at odds with Farris’ prioritization of the immaterial aspect of human beings, a view that holds that souls hope and spirits obey. From my perspective, Christian persons hope in the Lord and obey his Word.[14]
14. To be fair, Farris comes close to affirming a constitutive role for the human body (in the following citation, one can substitute “souls” for “minds” and “bodies” for “brains”): “human minds are, somehow, functionally (in a strong sense) dependent on their brains. . . . In fact, our mental experience is severely affected by our bodies and brains. . . . [For example,] when we experience a blow to the head, there is an obvious effect on our state of awareness” (Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 62). Given the findings of neuroscience, a much stronger case can be made for the constitutive role for the body than the one that appeals to traumatic brain injuries and focuses instead on the bio-neurological fact that human minds/mental events are intimately tied to bodies/brains.
Returning, then, to the issue of personal persistence after somatic death/post-mortem existence, I offer two alternatives:
- this earthly existence is not all there is, but human life extends beyond the grave/death
and - there is a soul (immaterial aspect, spirit) that persists after death and is immortal[15]
15. This option can be grounded on the philosophical view of the immortality of the soul (a well-established historical position expressed, for example, by Plato in Phaedo), or (from a more contemporary consideration), Kant’s postulate of pure practical reason: based on the obligation of the perfection of one’s self—the obligation to become morally perfect—belief in the immortality of the soul is a necessary postulate.
I affirm (1) that human life extends beyond the grave/after death, not as immortal souls, but as disembodied persons who await the return of Jesus Christ and an accompanying return to full human existence/complete redemption that consist of re-embodiment, that is, the resurrection of the body. Souls do not worship the Lord and rest from their labors in the intermediate state. Souls do not worship or rest; persons do, or, in this case, disembodied persons worship and rest.
Again, this “embodied person” view is grounded on the thesis that the proper state of human existence is embodiment. As a thought experiment, I offer some temporal considerations. A human being will live something like:
- 82 years of embodied personal existence, which begins at birth and ends at death at which I as an embodied person no longer exist in an earthly existence.
- 500 years of disembodied personal existence, which begins at death, persists in the intermediate state, and ends at the return of Jesus Christ (this is not a prophecy!) and the accompanying event of re-embodiment, the resurrection of one’s body.[16]
- An eternity of years of (re-)embodied/resurrected embodied personal existence, which begins at the return of Jesus Christ and the accompanying event of re-embodiment (the resurrection of one’s body) and never ends.
16. Another important foundation of my “embodied person” view is the condition of Christians in the intermediate state: “Importantly, this state of disembodiment is abnormal for human beings created as embodied image bearers of God. This disembodiment is so aberrant that Paul shutters in horror at the thought of such an existence . . . (2 Cor. 5:1–4). Using the metaphors of nakedness and being unclothed, Paul underscores how wrong human disembodiment is” (Allison, Embodied, 248). Thus, to determine the “true essence” of human existence by appeal to the immaterial condition of humans in the intermediate state is wrongheaded. For further discussion, see Allison, Embodied, 247-49.
The proper state of human existence is embodiment, a position that is determined by Scripture (Gen 1:26–28) and personal/human experience and confirmed by the resurrection of the body. Should my personal/human experience believe that I am primarily a soul or hold to the philosophical idea of the immortality of the soul, that idea is corrected by Scripture, which insists that embodied existence is the proper state and re-embodied existence is the true hope and telos of human beings. To clarify, the idea that there is a soul (immaterial aspect, spirit) that persists after death and that is immortal is fine as a commonsense simplification of the truth that humans will exist in a disembodied state, but it falls short of a full articulation of the biblical truth of eternal embodied existence.[17]
17. What, then, is the soul in my framework? In one sense, in the intermediate state, the soul is that aspect of human nature that persists as the disembodied person, who obviously lacks the other aspect of human nature, that is, the body. Accordingly, the soul is that substance that possesses powers and capacities distinct from a material substance and that is able to persist (through divine sustaining) during the intermediate state. In another sense, in the intermediate state, the soul is not/does not become the person. This is not to deny the idea of a core or fundamental identity that is the heart or soul or spirit of a person, as long as one maintains that the acting subject is the person him/herself and not some essential feature—the soul or spirit—that acts for or in place of the person him/herself.
By contrast, Farris maintains “Naturally, we are inclined to believe that we are distinct from our bodies.”[18] He supports this inclination in the following:
18. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 21.
When a person reflects on his or her hands or feet, the person naturally distinguishes the self from his or her hands and feet. Hands and feet are distinct objects of consciousness that are nonidentifiable with me, nor do they essentially constitute who I am. Who I am is made up of something else fundamentally and essentially. I am a mind or a soul, for I could lose my feet and hands and still I would remain the same person. In fact, I could lose several parts of my body and remain the selfsame person. Taking this in mind with the fact that there is no physical object with which I identify, I have reason to consider the possibility that I am something other than my body.[19]
19. Farris, Introduction to Theological Anthropology, 22.
I disagree with Farris. The loss of hands and feet, to use his examples, would profoundly alter the person I was before the loss. Famous women artists such as Frieda Khalo (1907-1954) and Georgia O’Keefe (1887–1986) would have been significantly different painters with significantly different life stories, careers, and influence if they had lost their hands. Famous hockey players such as Jacques Plante (1929–1986) and Gordie Howe (1928–2016) would have been significantly different hockey players with significantly different life stories, careers, and influence if they had lost their feet. Of course, I agree that numerically, all four would have remained identical to the persons they were before the loss; they would have been the selfsame persons. But on all the metrics used to assess personal flourishing—happiness, productivity, trauma, emotions, accomplishments, engagement or withdrawal, meaningful existence—they would have been significantly different people.[20]
20. These metrics of human flourishing are curated from websites such as Flourish Model | Flourishing Metrics and Our Flourishing Measure | The Human Flourishing Program (from The Human Flourishing Program at Harvard’s Institute for Quantitative Social Science).
Practical Implications
I underscore two practical advantages of my “embodied person” view over that of Farris. The first provides help for our perception of embodiment and its impact on sickness and injury. Farris’ statement (cited above) “the fact that there is no physical object with which I identify” is misleading. Of course I identify with my physical body. I can colloquially state “my lungs have cancer” or “my heart had an attack,” but the reality is “I have cancer” and “I had a heart attack.” We are implicated in our bodies, and the “embodied person” view aids us in wrestling with the consequences of our embodiment without locating sin in our bodies or identifying our bodies with sin but acknowledging that “the defects of the body are contracted by humanity as a consequence of the fall.”[21]
21. Matthew A. Lapine, The Logic of the Body: Retrieving Theological Psychology (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2020), 262.
Second, my “embodied person” view addresses the challenge of the persistence of identity that Farris offers as a problem for all materialistic (physicalist, non-reductive physicalist) views (of which my “embodied person” view is not an example): “Intuitively, from my basic experience of the self, I am something distinct from my body by virtue of the persistent conditions of the self.”[22] For Farris, this “something distinct from my body” is one’s soul, which he believes persists and thus maintains one’s identity. For me, this “something distinct from my body” is one’s person, which I believe persists (as embodied in this earthly existence, as disembodied in the intermediate state, and as re-embodied after Christ’s return) and thus maintains one’s identity. After all, “I am my body.” As Federica Mathewes-Green offers, “The initial impression that we stand critically apart from our bodies was our first mistake. We are not merely passengers riding around in skintight racecars; we are our bodies. They embody us.”[23]
