In my first essay, I described the Christian Platonist movement that is gaining traction today. In this essay, I offer a preliminary critique. My assessment is threefold. First, I will acknowledge praiseworthy aspects of Christian Platonism. Second, I will demonstrate some of Christian Platonism’s fundamental errors. And third, I will propose a path forward for constructing a metaphysic—that is, a view of the nature and structure of reality—that is more faithful to Scripture. Taken together, I will argue that Christian Platonism is not worth retrieving today.
What is Praiseworthy?
Let me begin with the praiseworthy elements of Christian Platonism. What follows are some things that I whole-heartedly affirm and am grateful for about the Christians Platonist movement:
- The call to reflect on metaphysics through a theological lens
- The call to embrace the doctrines of classical theism (divine simplicity, impassibility, immutability, etc.)
- The zealous rejection of materialistic naturalism (“only the material world exists”) and nominalism (“’universals’ have no real existence”)
- The vehement rejection of secularism and its attendant consequences in theology, ethics, politics, and biblical hermeneutics.
- The commitment to Christ and the ardent desire to be in a close and intimate relationship with the triune God
- A respect and fascination for the impact of Plato (and the rest of the Greek philosophical tradition) on Christian orthodoxy and Western society[1]
1. Later this month, David Talcott, author of Plato in the Great Thinkers series, will offer an introduction to and commendation for reading Plato.
I do not question the conviction of the brothers in Christ who embrace Christian Platonism. We share much in common, especially our concern for recovering an appreciation for metaphysics and ontology. Yet while I gratefully acknowledge what is praiseworthy in Christian Platonism, the critiques of this system ultimately outweigh the commendations.
Ur-Confusionism: Christian Platonism’s Fundamental Issues
In this section, I will concentrate on what, in my view, constitutes the fundamental or primitive (Ur-) confusion that underlies the paradigm of Christian Platonism, especially as it is offered up by Craig Carter and Hans Boersma. For fun, let’s call it “Ur-Confusionism.” I am convinced it is characterized by one simple thing: pervasive oversimplification. But in order to see this, we need to put on our “logic bi-focals.” With one lens focused on logical errors of “false equivalence” and the other focused on “false dilemmas,” let’s take a look.
False Equivalence
First, I will offer two striking instances of false equivalence found in Christian Platonism. A false equivalence is an informal logical error “where someone incorrectly asserts that two (or more) things are equivalent simply because they share some characteristics, despite there also being substantial differences between them.” It would be a false equivalence to equate Rugby and American football, a tangerine and an orange, or a crocodile and an alligator, for instance. While each pair shares some similar qualities, their differences are significant enough that to equate the two would be an error!
The two instances of false equivalence that Christian Platonists make both stem from defining Christian Platonism too broadly. Recall that Christian Platonism is apparently the “theological metaphysics of the Great Tradition,” or more specifically, Augustinianism—the school of thought that originated from Saint Augustine (354–430 AD). Yet, Christian Platonism also defines itself by Lloyd Gerson’s Ur-Platonism (Platonism by negation), while also including several Platonic affirmations, namely sacramental ontology and allegorical exegesis.
But that’s not all. If you read Christian Platonist authors, you will find the likes of Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, as well as the entire Scholastic realist tradition classified as—you guessed it—Christian Platonists! At this point, we are either tangled up with a conflation of views that actually are not the same at crucial points or simply describing orthodox, classical Christianity itself. As I see it, by defining Christian Platonism too broadly, adherents to this metaphysic gloss over the finer philosophical and theological differences between all of these people. Here is what I mean.
False Equivalence #1: By calling Aristotle a Platonist, Christian Platonists gloss over critical distinctions between Aristotle and Plato. We can acknowledge with Craig Carter (who follows Lloyd Gerson here) that Aristotle (384–322 BC), Plato’s student, shared broad philosophical agreement with Plato and other Platonists (i.e., Ur-Platonism). However, Aristotle was not a Platonist in the traditional sense. Most importantly, while Aristotle affirmed the existence of immaterial universals (thus rejecting nominalism), he placed them in material particulars. Therefore, instead of particulars participating in universals (Plato), universals had to be abstracted from the particulars (Aristotle).[2]
2. For example, for Plato, the perfect form of a man exists independently in the realm of the forms and all men in the sensible world are simply imperfect instantiations of that man. The form/universal is primary and the particular is secondary. Aristotle, on the other hand, rejected the realm of the forms. Instead, he said that the real universal of man exists in the many particular men. To know the universal, it must be abstracted from particulars that share the quality of man-ness. The particular is primary, while the universal is secondary.
As a result, Aristotle rejected Plato’s doctrine of the Forms[3] and decried the notion of participation.[4] He wrote “To say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors.”[5] Aristotle, therefore, the Ur-Platonist that he is, may abide by Platonism by negation (Ur-Platonism), but he clearly contradicts Platonism by affirmation (participation, sacramental ontology, allegory, etc.). So, for Carter to call Aristotle a Platonist in the context of theological retrieval is misleading. Like a lumberjack, Aristotle wielded his ax upon the very trunk of Christian Platonism—sacramental ontology—by rejecting the doctrine of participation. Is this not how the decline of Platonic metaphysics began, which eventually opened the door to a rejection of universals distinct from the particular? Interesting.
3. As a reminders from the previous essay, Plato postulated that reality has two kinds of things in two different realms—(1) the eternal, immaterial forms in the unchangeable realm of the forms (e.g., the ideal form of a man, woman, horse, Beauty, Justice, etc.) and (2) the material, sensible objects we live among in the ever-changing physical universe (e.g., particular men, women, horses, beautiful architecture, just laws, etc.). These two realms relate to one another through “participation.”
The problem as I see it, for Christian Platonists, is that Aristotle is a critical and pervasive influence in the history of Christian theology. We see his influence especially in the theology of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 AD), which Carter says is “the most widespread and successful form that Christian Platonism has taken historically.” While Boersma acknowledges that “some scholars locate the demise of this Platonist-Christian synthesis in the theology of Thomas Aquinas,”[6] Carter tends to think instead that it was Aquinas’s singular effort that expertly appropriated Aristotle, thus preserving and advancing the Christian Platonist metaphysics. Suffice it to say, while there are undoubtedly Neoplatonic elements to Thomas Aquinas’s thought, his metaphysics and epistemology are thoroughly Aristotelian, in ways that fundamentally contradict traditional, Platonic thought. Glossing over all this, as Carter does, mucks things up a bit.
4. Again, “participation” is the word used to signify how universals (immaterial things) relate to particulars (material things); or, in the case of Christian Platonism, how creaturely being is related to God. For example, all the circles in the world (your kids’ hula-hoop, the moon, or your car’s steering wheel, etc.) are really imperfect images or models of a true “Circle,” or circularity, which really does exist, but only in the realm of Forms, inaccessible to us. The circles we see are particular circles, the Circle we know they all have in common is a universal, immaterial thing.
5. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 991a20 (emphasis mine).
6. Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 36.
False Equivalence #2: By equating Thomism and the Reformed tradition with Christian Platonism, Christian Platonists gloss over the eclectic nature of the Reformed tradition’s philosophical influences. Esteemed historical theologian, Richard Muller, notes that “[t]he simplest and best description of the philosophical perspective (or perspectives) found among the Reformed thinkers of both the Reformation and the early orthodox eras is ‘eclectic.’”[7] For instance, while there are some signs that John Calvin “leaned toward Platonism,” he also undeniably incorporated Scotist, possible nominalist leanings, and Stoic elements in this theology.[8] Peter Vermigli, on the other hand, was much more aligned with the Thomistic tradition (the theological tradition originating from Thomas Aquinas). Later on, we find even “the Westminster Divines—most notably [William] Twisse—indicated that an Aristotelian philosophy could be adapted and modified for Christian use, whereas the alternative Platonic models offered little assistance.”[9] While some of the Reformed scholastic thinkers preferred Plato, they thought Platonism to be the root of patristic heresies![10] After thoroughly investigating this eclectic philosophical tradition, Muller says: “It is certainly more useful to characterize many of the Reformed orthodox as holding a form of modified (sometimes highly modified) Thomism often with Scotistic or nominalstic accents, sometimes with strong affinities for the philosophies of the day . . . than to speak of them as simply Aristotelian.”[11]
7. Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Volume 1: Prolegomena to Theology (Grand Rapid: Baker Academic, 2003), 67.
8. Muller, PRRD, 1:366. “Scotist” refers to the school of thought influenced by John Duns Scotus, who affirmed univocity of being (from the previous essay).
9. Muller, PRRD, 1:369.
10. Muller, PRRD, 1:369. There is a compelling case against this argument by Theophilus Gale in a recent and impressive essay by Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, “The One and the Trinity,” in Christian Platonism: A History, ed. by Alexander J. B. Hampton and John Peter Kenney (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 53–78.
11. Muller, PRRD, 1:380. For a penetrating analysis of “Reformed philosophy,” see chapter eight, entitled “The Use of Philosophy in Theology” in Muller, PRRD, I:360–405.
At the same time, if we ought not speak of the scholastics as simply Aristotelian, we also ought not speak of them simply as Platonists. While Carter and Boersma do intimate there were some “Aristotelian complications” in the Middle Ages, pigeon-holing the Great Tradition to simply follow the artificial line of Christian Platonism—from Augustine to Thomas to the Reformed Scholastics—glosses over so many important theological, philosophical, and historical details. Not only is the Great Tradition more inclusive than Christian Platonists suggest, but down to theologians themselves we find an eclectic philosophical-theological paradigm that evades simplistic labels, like “Christian Platonist.” The compelling picture of our theological forefathers, judiciously employing various philosophical insights, is one that we must revive if we are to do faithful retrieval. Yet I’m afraid that this impulse for precision is overshadowed by the broad strokes of Christian Platonism—whose method of analysis is quite impressionistic, like a Monet or Van Gogh painting, rather than the realism of Michelangelo or Caravaggio.
False Dilemma
Next, not only do Christian Platonists commit the false equivalence fallacy, there are at least six popular false dilemmas (or false dichotomies) endorsed by Christian Platonism. A false dilemma is “a logical fallacy that occurs when a limited number of options are wrongly presented as being mutually exclusive or the only available options.” Here are six false dilemmas you will find in the writings of contemporary Christian Platonists today:
- Embrace Christian Platonism or Oppose Philosophy Itself[12]
- Embrace Christian Platonism or Forfeit Orthodox Christian Theology (the Great Tradition)[13]
- Embrace Christian Platonism or Oppose Reason, the Moral Law, and Natural Science[14]
- Embrace Christian Platonism or Deny the Presence of Christ in the Old Testament (Or Embrace the Historical-Critical Method)[15]
- Embrace Christian Platonism or Deny Biblical Augustinianism[16]
- Embrace Christian Platonism or Cultivate Modernism and/or Gnosticism[17]
12. Craig Carter, Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition: Recovering the Genius of Premodern Exegesis (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2018), 82.
13. Boersma contends that “the Great Tradition was, in an important sense, the product of a Platonist-Christian synthesis.” Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 179. Also see Craig Carter, Contemplating God with the Great Tradition: Recovering Trinitarian Classical Theism (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2021), 127, where he equates Christian Platonism with Nicene metaphysics.
14. Carter, Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition, 82.
15. Boersma, Heavenly Participation, 38–39.
16. Matthew Barrett, “First Principles,” Credo 12, no. 1 (2022).
17. Carter, Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition, 84–85.
These, of course, are a stunning series of claims! To behold this list highlights the totalizing claim that Christian Platonists makes upon the history of Christian theology and philosophy. Since I cannot address each point here, I’ll simply direct you to others who have. Given our discussion of false equivalence, false dilemmas #1 and #2 should be self-evidently false. False dilemma #3 is treated in Iain Provan’s helpful critique of sacramental ontology and Platonic metaphysics.[18] Provan argues explicitly that “modern science was not built on the foundation of the Platonist-Christian synthesis,” but rather an explicitly Christian foundation. Daniel Treier offers a nuanced critique of issues related to #4, in his essay entitled “‘Christian Platonism’ and Christological Interpretation: A Response to Craig A. Carter, Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition.” Treier, while offering a fascinating alternative to sacramental ontology (my proposal below bears some similarity to his), also offers a sensitive and generous critique of Carter and Boersma, who “suspect that modern biblical scholarship—even among evangelicals—undermines robustly Trinitarian and Christological reading of Scripture.” Finally, Paul Gould and Jordan Steffaniak, in their own way, offer concise responses to #2, #5 and #6 over at the London Lyceum. Gould points out and refutes these false dichotomies explicitly, while Steffaniak helpfully explains historical and conceptual problems tied to the various definitions of Christian Platonism offered by Carter. Suffice it to say, these false dilemmas are pervasive in Christian Platonism and undermine the credibility of the Christian Platonist movement. Fear not: you do not need to be a “Christian Platonist” to avoid these errors.
18. See Iain Provan, The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2017), 420–422.
Summary of the Confusion
What unifies false equivalence and false dichotomy? Oversimplification. And these oversimplifications in Christian Platonism give rise to fairly obvious and pervasive errors. Whether it glosses over critical philosophical differences between Plato and Aristotle, metaphysical varieties within the Great Tradition itself, or embraces the slew of aforementioned false dilemmas, these arguments should leave us wondering: If we retrieve this Christian Platonism, will it not be spoiled yeast in our theological endeavors? For a little leaven leavens the whole lump.
Beyond Christian Platonism: A Path Forward for a Biblical Metaphysic of Creation and Scripture
In light of the tendency towards (Ur-)Confusion, I cannot endorse the popular and contemporary Christian Platonism movement. But besides pointing out its errors, is there anything constructive to say? In this section, I will make the case that we should get our metaphysic from the sixty-six books of the Bible—full stop. Yes, we can use nature and philosophy as aids, but only as they fall strictly under the authority of special revelation. Sacramental ontology, along with its friend allegorical exegesis, are not on especially good terms with Scriptural teaching. I hope to show you this even as I argue that you can develop a metaphysic that comes from and conforms to the biblical canon.
You Can Get Your Theological Metaphysic from the Bible (Alone)
Advocates of Christian Platonism make it pretty clear that their theological metaphysic is a synthesis of Greek philosophy and the orthodox distinctives of the Christin faith. Boersma, for instance, labels his sacramental ontology a “Platonist-Christian synthesis.” Carter fleshes this out, noting that “Christian Platonism is a synthesis of the best of rational Greek philosophy and biblical revelation and is responsible for the flowering of Western Christendom.”[19] To be sure, the “best of rational Greek philosophy,” as we have seen, are Greek doctrines that aren’t directly contradicted by Scripture. But these Platonic doctrines (Ur-Platonism, sacramental ontology, participation, etc.) are truths from the Platonic tradition that are nevertheless essential components to their metaphysic. The only conclusion, it would seem, is that a Christian view of reality relies upon notions found only in Platonism. In other words, for the Christian Platonist, you cannot understand the Bible without adopting a frame of reference that comes outside the Bible (Platonism). This is a big problem.
19. Carter, Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition, 84 (emphasis mine).
Yes, one might quibble about how or whether any elements of Carter or Boersma’s proposals meet that above qualification (as you will see below, I recognize potential usefulness in participation terminology). But this way of articulating Christian Platonism demands a strong counter-proposal: the Bible has its own worldview, its own metaphysic of the created order. God has revealed to us everything we need to know—both in Scripture and in creation—in order to construct a view of reality that reflects his own, thus thinking his thoughts after him. Even notions that seem to yearn for a “Platonic” explanation, are they not already revealed to God’s people even hundreds of years before the great Ur-Platonist consensus? Was not the glory of divine goodness revealed to Moses (Exod. 33:19–20) and did he not see him who was invisible (Heb. 11:27)? Did David and Isaiah not have a conception of an immaterial “realm” and savor the incomprehensible divine attributes of their Lord (e.g. Psalm 36 and Isaiah 40)? And was it not from this rich revelational heritage primarily that Christ and the apostles came? This doesn’t mean we take a so-called “biblicist” approach and reject all extra-biblical language.[20] That would not be wise or realistic. Instead, we must pay close attention to what Scripture says in order to properly articulate biblical metaphysics. Here is how that might look, in contrast to a sacramental ontology.
20. See Stephen Wellum’s excellent discussion on the use of extra-biblical language in theology, Stephen Wellum, Systematic Theology (Brentwood: B&H Academic, 2024), 1:138–42.
A “Revelational Ontology” of Creation
To do this—as a note of preparation—we’ll have to have get into the weeds a bit. I want to suggest that there is a glaring omission in the theological metaphysics of Christian Platonism. This omission is a robust doctrine of natural revelation. The sacramental ontology of Christian Platonism teaches that all of creation participates in God and thus is itself a sacrament pointing back to him. Remember: acccording to them, this belief apparently grounds natural theology, natural science, and natural law. But in Scripture, we discover a philosophy of reality that emphasizes revelation of God over participation. I think something is lost by framing our metaphysics as participatory or sacramental, rather than revelational. To show you this, I will briefly outline two elements that could offer the basic framework for a “revelational ontology.”
First, a “revelational ontology” recognizes that participation cannot ultimately account for the natural knowledge of God. Carter, for instance, rightly affirms that math facts are in God’s mind. Thus, to know mathematical principles is to know something of the God whose mind they reflect. But he grounds our knowledge of these indemonstrable facts in participation: “The human mind participates in the universals of mathematics by participating in the ideas in the mind of God.”[21] One can see the logic of this philosophically-speaking, but I’m proposing that this is not quite right, biblically-speaking. “Well, why not participation then?” I hear someone ask with bated breath! Let’s talk about that for a moment.
21. See Craig Carter, “Why We Should Affirm Christian Platonism,” Credo 12, no. 1 (2022), specifically section three under “Systematic Reasons.”
On the one hand, I am sympathetic with the concern that a strong doctrine of ontological participation may blur the Creator-creature distinction and thus lead to various forms of mutualism (the heterodox view that God’s nature undergoes change in relation to his creatures). While this is most certainly not what Craig Carter and other classical theists want, some “Christian Platonist” theologians (like Boersma, for instance) and their primary influences seem closer to this error than others, and it is a bit ironic. For example, consider the excellent case Lane Tipton makes for what he calls “back door mutualism” inherent in the Trinitarian theology of Thomas Aquinas (which revolves around Neoplatonist notions of participation in divine being). Or, consider Paul Gould, a Christian Platonist himself, who affirms participation in a “sacramental universe,” but believes it necessarily entails univocity of being (the doctrine that blurs the Creator/creature distinction, and one that for other Christian Platonists, spells the end of Christian theology itself).[22] The moral of the story is: a doctrine of participation needs a very clear and careful definition before we employ it for good use in Christian theology.
22. Paul Gould, Four Views on Christian Metaphysics, ed. Timothy M. Mosteller (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2022), 29.
But if, on the other hand, all we mean by participation is the basic recognition that all creatures “live and move and have [their] being” in God, the Creator (Acts 17:28) and that in our sanctification we, in some sense, “partake of the divine nature” (2 Pet. 1:4), then we should have no problem. Participation can be a simple term employed to convey creation’s total and constant need for the God who is self-sufficient, while simultaneously recognizing “nature as appropriately ‘detached’ from God and possessing its own integrity.”[23] For “from him, and to him, and through him are all things” (Rom 11:36). It can also be used to convey our covenantal union with Christ (1 Cor. 10:16).
23. Iain Provan, The Reformation and the Right Reading of Scripture, 420.
In either case, advocates of sacramental ontology teach that our (and all of creation’s) participation in the triune God is hidden, lying mysteriously in created reality—sacramentally. As a result, participation in God needs to be presupposed, discovered, and then traced back to its Source. Carter rightly notes that “[w]hen we look around us, we see a society that views rational proofs for the existence of God as silly and is in rebellion against the natural moral law.”[24] He is convinced that participation obliges the Christian to formulate and present rational arguments for the existence of God and the moral law. But here is the crucial thing: the participatory dimension on its own lacks the ultimate ground for natural knowledge, since notions of participation and sacrament don’t in themselves exercise authoritative and clear communication. In other words, to discover that or how something in creation participates in God requires human reason to follow the sacrament like a sign back to where it points. Of course, there is some truth to this. But I believe the Bible says something more.
24. Carter, Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition, 85.
Second, the biblical authors tie the natural knowledge of God to creation via revelation. God’s natural revelation is both external and internal. Externally, God’s “invisible attributes” and “divine nature” are revealed in what has been made (Rom. 1:20). The heavens declare unendingly the glory and righteousness of God by recounting and proclaiming these perfections (Ps. 19:1, 50:6), day after day and night after night (Ps. 19:2). Internal to every human being, God’s revelation emerges and impacts mankind from within through the religious consciousness and moral conscience (Rom. 2:14–15).[25] Both external and internal general revelation is an authoritative and perspicuous (able to be understood) revelation that makes God (the object) known to those beholding it (rational subjects), apart from a process of reasoning. For all men and women clearly perceive and know this God “in the things that have been made,” yet they suppress this truth in unrighteousness and are without excuse (Rom. 1:18–21).
25. Vos, Biblical Theology (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 2012), 19.
Therefore, while our metaphysic of creation can certainly affirm a participatory element, I propose that a properly biblical metaphysic begins with and gives greater emphasis to the revelatory element of creation as a means of grounding our knowledge of God’s existence and his attributes in creation. Created realities, as well as historical phenomena, therefore, clearly reveal God through participated perfections because they are first revelatory. I’m afraid that greater attention to how we can synthesize Greek thought with Christian orthodoxy, as well as inattention to the biblical text causes the metaphysic of Christian Platonism to miss the mark.
An Allergy to Allegory?
So there’s that. But what’s with that “allegory interpretation” thing? Before we wrap up, I need to touch on that just briefly. As I explained in the prior essay, for theologians like Boersma and Carter, if all of creation is essentially a sacrament, then so too is Scripture. We are obliged, then, to read it in a manner fitting to its nature, namely allegorically. For the Christian Platonist, this is airtight logic, and it leads to an allegorical method of exegesis.
But what is allegorical exegesis? While this signature doctrine finds various expressions within the Christian Platonist movement, it is united in both (1) minimizing the importance of human authorial intent and (2) downplaying the difference between typology and allegory (a distinction which I believe is critical to preserve). This leads to a hermeneutic that, for any given biblical text, may yield many meanings, often with little interpretive controls. In fact, for Boersma (who may arguably be the most extreme case), Scriptural meaning is “infinite in its possibilities.”[26]
26. Boersma, Scripture as Real Presence, 19. Craig Carter is more reserved in his affirmation of allegorical interpretation and more vocal about his desire to keep it tied to the literal, historical sense.
Might all these possible meanings move us away from a careful reading of Scripture as we seek to formulate a metaphysical view, for instance? Ultimately, this is a trend we are still observing. Recognizing that there is a more thorough reflection on this sacramental hermeneutic coming later this month, I want to recognize one thing.[27] Allegorical exegesis is out of step with Scripture’s testimony of itself, namely that it is a progressive revelation, structured by covenants, and unified canonically. Do I, then, have an allergy to allegory? Not allegories in Scripture, but certainly “allegorical interpretation” that reads texts for meanings “other” (allos) than God intends through the human authors. Why? Because I am working with a different metaphysic which I believe is closer to what Scripture teaches.
27. See Knox Brown’s forthcoming essay, “the Hermeneutics of Christian Platonism.”
Conclusion
So what are we to make of all this? First, as I said, there are several things one can really appreciate about Christian Platonism. For instance, I share a zealous opposition to secularism and a love for the doctrines of “classical theism.” Yet, I am not persuaded that this movement of Christian Platonism offers a coherent and systematic metaphysic worthy of retrieval. The pervasive oversimplification in its historical, philosophical, and theological analysis leaves much to be desired. Also, I do not find sacramental ontology to be the most biblical metaphysic one can use to describe creation and Scripture. I think it comes with attendant dangers, namely a “synthetic” philosophy and a looming threat to sola Scriptura, given its embrace of allegorical exegesis.
To put the matter bluntly: my final evaluation is that Christian Platonism is not worth retrieving. To do so would be to forfeit the careful, exacting eclecticism of our Protestant forefathers, instead trading it for a whole system called “Christian Platonism,” plagued by (Ur-)confusion and a metaphysic that doesn’t quite hit the mark. I am convinced there is a better path forward that arises from the Bible itself.
